It appears that the designers of seawalls for the Japanese coastal cities affected by the 2011 earthquake did not consider all the combinations of environmental factors that set the effective height of a tsunami.
Archive for the ‘Assumptions’ Category
Sea Walls and Epistemic Risk
Posted in Assumptions, Uncertainty, tagged coastal defences, earthquake, japanese 2011 tsunami, overtopping, seawalls, subsidence, tsunami on 29/08/2011 | Leave a Comment »
The Titanic Effect (Part II)
Posted in Aerospace Safety, Assumptions, tagged AF 447, AirBus, assumptions, Titanic on 07/08/2011 | Leave a Comment »
Thinking about the unintentional and contra-indicating stall warning signal of AF 447 I was struck by the common themes between AF 447 and the Titanic. In both the design teams designed a vehicle compliant to the regulations of the day. But in both cases an implicit design assumption as to how the system would be operated was invalidated.
Rotor Bursts and Single Points of Failure (Part II)
Posted in Aerospace Safety, Assumptions, Common cause failures, Logic of Scientific Discovery, System architecting, tagged A380, AirBus, ARP 4761, certification basis, common cause failures, jet engine unconfined failures, particular hazard analysis, Qantas, QF 32, Singapore, zonal hazard analysis on 11/01/2011 | Leave a Comment »
A report by the AIA on engine rotor bursts and their expected severity raises questions about the levels of damage sustained by QF 32.
Rotor Bursts and Single Point of Failure
Posted in Aerospace Safety, Assumptions, fail safe, tagged A380, AC 20-128A, AirBus, assumptions, certification basis, QF 32, rotor burst, single point of failure, SPOF on 07/01/2011 | Leave a Comment »
It appears that the underlying certification basis for aircraft safety in the event of a intermediate power turbine rotor bursts is not supported by the rotor failure seen on QF 32.
The Titanic Effect (Part I)
Posted in Assumptions, Risk Assessment, Safety, Uncertainty, tagged Complexity, epistemic risk, implicit design assumptions, Operational procedures, Risk, Titanic, Watertight bulkheads on 27/09/2010 | 1 Comment »
So why did the Titanic sink? The reason highlights the role of implicit design assumptions in complex accidents and the interaction of design with operations of safety critical systems
I tend towards the integrative rather than reductionist view of engineering and science. I'm interested in emergence, networks, relationships and interfaces as they apply to safety.what are the facts?
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