Why We Automate Failure A recent post on the interface issues surrounding the use of side-stick controllers in current generation passenger aircraft led me to think more generally about the the current pre-eminence of software driven visual displays and why we persist in their use even though there may be a mismatch between what they [...]
Archive for the ‘The human machine interface’ Category
When All You Have is a Hammer…
Posted in Cognitive psychology, System architecting, The human machine interface, tagged cognitive engineering, glass cockpit, HMI on 19/09/2011 | 3 Comments »
Pilots in the Loop? Airbus and the FBW Side Stick
Posted in Aerospace Safety, Cognitive psychology, Human error, The human machine interface, Violations, tagged AF 447, AirBus, ATSB, crew coordination, FBW, NTSB, side stick controller on 16/09/2011 | 2 Comments »
Airbuses side stick improves crew comfort and control, but is there a hidden cost? The Airbus FBW side stick flight control has vastly improved the comfort of aircrew flying the Airbus fleet, much as the original Airbus designers predicted (Corps, 188). But the implementation also expresses the Airbus approach to flight control laws and that [...]
Side Sticks and Shared Situational Awareness
Posted in Aerospace Safety, Human error, The human machine interface, tagged AF447, AirBus, centre stick controller, cockpit error management, crew resource management, Risk, Safety, side stick controller on 27/07/2011 | 3 Comments »
One of the less often considered aspects of situational awareness in the cockpit is the element of knowing what the ‘guy in the other seat is doing’. This is a particularly important part of cockpit error management because without a shared understanding of what someone is doing it’s supremely difficult to detect errors. The replacement of the central control stick with side stick ‘glass’ controllers eliminates a little acknowledged means of coordinating a common understanding of control inputs between aircrew with the potential for a hazardous loss of crew error management.
On the Brittleness of Software
Posted in Aerospace Safety, Human error, The human machine interface, tagged AF447, Air France, design assumptions, design paradigm, epistemic risk, James Reason, never give up design strategy, requirements incompleteness, Software latent fault, stall warning on 23/07/2011 | 3 Comments »
Reading through the BEA’s precis of the data contained on AF447′s Flight Data Recorder you find that during the final minutes of AF447 the aircrafts stall warning ceased, even though the aircraft was still stalled. This loss of stall warning removed a significant cue to the aircrew that they had flown the aircraft into a deep stall, undoubtedly adding to their confusion. SU4CF4KDVSWQ
While We’re on the Subject of Human Factors
Posted in Complexity, The human machine interface, tagged conceptual design tool, ergonomics, functional reach, hand grip, human factors, NASA-STD-3000, seated workstation design on 19/07/2011 | 1 Comment »
One of the areas of human factors in design is the physical layout of a seated workstation or control console to suit the functional reach capabilities of the user population. Should be simple right? Wrong.
Through a Mirror Darkly…
Posted in Human error, The human machine interface, tagged FFG 7, functional versus sequential grouping, human errors, MIL-STD-1472, mirrored controls, PCC, refractory on 13/07/2011 | Leave a Comment »
Good and bad in the design of an Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates ECS propulsion control console HMI.
QF 32 and Checklists
Posted in Aerospace Safety, Cognitive psychology, The human machine interface, tagged ATSB, automated checklists, cognitive limitations, ECAM, multiple failures, QF32 on 11/07/2011 | Leave a Comment »
According to the preliminary ATSB report the crew of QF32 took approximately 50 minutes to process all the Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitor (ECAM) messages. So, two questions for the ATSB. First would the normal three man crew have been able to handle the ECAM checklist work as readily? Second should the checklist processing have taken 50 minutes which is a very, very, long time in a mid air emergency?
Pitch Ladders and Unusal Attitude Recovery
Posted in Aerospace Safety, Cognitive psychology, The human machine interface, tagged AF447, F16, HUD, partially articulated, PFD, pitch ladder, Primary Flight Display, unusual attitude recovery, US DoD on 05/07/2011 | Leave a Comment »
Because they have typically pitch unity ratios (1:1) scales, aircraft primary flight displays provide a pitch display that is limited by the vertical field of view. This display can move very rapidly and be difficult to use in unusual attitude recoveries becoming another adverse performance shaping factor for aircrew in such a scenario. Trials by the USAF have conclusively demonstrated that an articulated style of pitch ladder can reduce disorientation of aircrew in such situations.
Making it HOT for the Operator
Posted in Highly optimised tolerance, The human machine interface, tagged automation, automation as prosthesis, Complexity, HOT, knowledge, robsut yet fragile, robustness, rule, Skill, unreliable air speed on 03/06/2011 | 1 Comment »
Recent work in complexity and robustness theory for engineered systems has highlighted that the architecture with which these systems are designed inherently leads to ‘robust yet fragile’ behavior. This vulnerability has strong implications for the human operator when he or she is expected to intervene in response to the failure of system.
The Right Attitude
Posted in The human machine interface, tagged Apollo, assumptions, Attitude Reference Indicatior, Command Module, Cultural cliche, expectations, human factors, Lunar Excursion Module on 27/05/2011 | 1 Comment »
How the design of the Apollo Command Module Attitude Reference Indicator illustrates the importance of cultural cliches or precedents in coordinating human and software behaviour.
Driving Tanks and Human Factors
Posted in Human error, The human machine interface, tagged human error types, M113 APC, operational context, physical skill on 06/05/2011 | 1 Comment »
How even apparently simple interfaces can contain subtle error traps Back in the day learner drivers of the then new M 113 were found to be repeatedly veering off the road or into oncoming traffic when trying to carry out an emergency stop. In some circumstances learner drivers would also accelerate while trying to perform [...]
Reflections on Reflections
Posted in The human machine interface, tagged crewstation design, design failures, display reflections, human factors, learning cycle, transparencies on 04/05/2011 | Leave a Comment »
Reflections on design errors in the human machine interface Having recently bought a new car I was driving home and noticed that the illuminated lighting controls were reflected in the right hand wing mirror. See the picture below for the effect. These sort of reflections are at best annoying, but in the worst case they could mask [...]
The QF72 A330 Accident – Send Lawyers, Guns & Money*
Posted in Aerospace Safety, Highly optimised tolerance, The human machine interface, tagged A330, Highly Optimised Tolerance, HOT, human machine interface, QF72, Voting algorithm on 22/09/2010 | Leave a Comment »
The fallout from the QF 72 in flight accident has now reached the courts with Australian Aviation reporting that passengers and crew have taken up a joint class action against Airbus and Northrop Grumman (the manufacturer of the faulty Air Data Inertial Reference Unit).
Human Factors & Rolling Stock
Posted in The human machine interface, tagged accessibility, automation, CORE 2010, human factors, human machine interface, rail, rolling stock on 16/08/2010 | Leave a Comment »
The effective use by humans of any transport system is a critical success factor in the development of such systems. Careful consideration of the interaction of ergonomic and functional design with the physical and cognitive capabilities and limitations of crew, passengers and maintainers is essential to assure safe, effective and profitable rail operations.
A Convenient Fiction (Automation as Proxy)
Posted in Aerospace Safety, Cognitive psychology, The human machine interface, tagged expert systems, gulf of execution, gulf of perception, over automation, perception, rule based systems on 06/07/2010 | Leave a Comment »
The reality is that when pilots fly through an icing event or a driver steers through a skid the aircraft or car is not intelligent, the intelligence is actually in the head of the designer, the automation is merely his proxy.
The Tangara Dead Man Pedal
Posted in Rail Safety, The human machine interface, tagged common cause, Complexity, Dead man switch, human factors, human machine interface, Waterfall accident on 05/05/2010 | 4 Comments »
5.3.16.3 (4) The pedal design and/or operation shall be such that it cannot be over-ridden or tampered with in order to negate the safety feature. State Rail Authority (SRA) specification (5.3.16.3) On the 31st of January 2003 at approx. 7:14 am a four car Tangara passenger train on run C311 from Sydney Central to Port Kembla (G7) oversped on a downhill [...]
I tend towards the integrative rather than reductionist view of engineering and science. I'm interested in emergence, networks, relationships and interfaces as they apply to safety.what are the facts?
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